I attended on Thursday a public discussion in Sofia entitled, “Ukraine's Struggle for Europe: Mapping Ukraine’s Choices before the Protests and after Vilnius.” It was held at the European Commission Representation in Bulgaria and organised by the Centre for Liberal Strategies (CLS). The key speaker was Mr Valentyn Gladkykh, a young political scientist who is currently Chief Adviser of Verkhovna Rada's Secretariat; the other two panellists were Ognyan Minchev of IRIS, the policy institute I work at, and Lithuania’s Ambassador to Bulgaria, H.E. Darius Gaidys, representing the EU Presidency. Moderation was provided by CLS’s Antoinette Primatarova.
Photo by Nessa Gnatoush, Wikimedia Commons / Flickr (bit.ly/18Gm4lx)
This was a very useful event which got its due attention, judging by the people present, but it also helped some ideas I had about Ukraine, the EU, Russia, and the Euromaidan protests crystallise. Here are some thoughts:
1) Ukraine is far from a country simply and bluntly divided into a pro-EU west and pro-Russian east. We in the EU like to think: you see, Ukraine’s west has this Polish and Austro-Hungarian heritage, cities like Lviv are truly European, and the east – the east is the Donbas industrial area, with Dnipropetrovsk the true embodiment of a Soviet city; the east is where the Russian speakers live, and it is heart-and-mind Russian. True, some rough line of distinction exists, but it's a distinction of voting preferences having its roots back in the Orange Revolution of 2004. There isn’t a single region in Ukraine where Russians are a majority except in Crimea, the peninsula in the far south. In other words, the division is electoral; it has to do with Yanukovych’s Party of Regions on one side and the ‘Orangists’ on the other. Or maybe was is the correct word: Gladkykh, at the Sofia event, said many people who voted for Yanukovych in the last parliamentary election, especially those in the east, are very disappointed with him now. On the other hand, Ukraine is facing a choice: Minchev said it is the choice many European nations made after 1848 – the choice of sovereignty and nation-building over the imperial model existing until then. The problem with the ex-Soviet countries is that nation-building was inhibited – frozen – during the USSR years and now, when this logical process has started to take place, Russia is trying to block it by virtue of the imperial perception of its own development. The Euromaidan protests are not so much pro-EU protests as they are action of support of the sovereignty and independence of the Ukrainian nation, a vision which somehow collides with what Yanukovych does and what Putin imagines Ukraine should do.
2) Yanukovych has taken over Ukraine to such an extent that this has started backfiring. He is in charge of the Presidency, obviously, and controls the cabinet of ministers, and his Party of Regions has a majority in the Verkhovna Rada and at local level. Thus a Lukashenko-type personality-centred regime has started budding, and whenever something goes wrong whether in Kyiv or in some distant town, east or west, Yanukovych is automatically to blame. He has come to be the personification, and reason behind, all good and bad in Ukrainian social and political life, and as of late there are not many good things to boast about.
3) Yanukovych will not cede power easily because he is afraid of prosecution. And he is right to be. He knows best what happened to Yulia Tymoshenko, and his sins, in the eyes of the Ukrainian public, are much greater than hers. One other reason for him to cling as long as possible to government is related to the EU. Closer ties with the bloc and even partial adoption by Ukraine of its values and norms would imply hard times for people like Yanukovych, who grew immensely rich since he came to power. His son became one of the wealthiest people in Ukraine. All this will have to be accounted for in a more transparent and EU-associated Ukraine, and he and his family may easily get a ban to travel to the EU. That's why he has bet on procrastinating and playing both the EU and Russia for the sake of the status quo's preservation.
4) For the future of Yanukovych and Ukraine, a decisive role is to be played by the oligarchs. Gladkykh said in Sofia that Ukraine’s political and economic elite are afraid of association with the EU because they simply don’t know how to deal with the Europeans – business-wise and culturally. They know how to do business with the Russians – they feel at home with them, but they are at a loss when having to abide by rules and meet standards as the EU and its investors expect. But this, while it may be true, is not the entire truth. Russian oligarchs are more powerful than their Ukrainian counterparts, and a Ukraine joining Russia’s Customs Union will result in Ukrainian tycoons being pushed out of business or having to pay a very high price to stay. Competition with the Russian oligarchs is not a very healthy business, either. Indeed, as a number of international media publications contend, Ukraine’s oligarchs are steadily shifting sides: they are withdrawing their support for Yanukovych for the sake of a European Ukraine with an access to the biggest single market in the world.
5) The EU and its foreign policy have been awoken to new life because of the Ukrainian fiasco (the failure to sign the AA and the consequent Euromaidan protests). Major EU figures, both from the Brussels institutions and from key member states, have shown their support for Euromaidan by mingling with the protesters and by officially warning Ukrainian authorities to stop police repression. Such a thing is unprecedented. Never did Cathy Ashton go to Gezi Park, for example, to support the legitimate demands of Istanbul protesters, despite Turkey being an official EU candidate country; and never did she join Sofia’s #DANSwithMe popular anti-government action against corruption and lack of transparency, going on in the Bulgarian capital for more than 180 days. And Bulgaria is an EU member. One conclusion from the above is that you have to be both intrinsically European (which Turkey isn't) and big / important enough (which Bulgaria isn't) to be worthy of being the object of the fledgling common EU (foreign) policy. Ukraine is both.
6) The similarities between Bulgaria and Ukraine vis-à-vis the protest movements of 2013 and the governments’ reaction to them are striking. It’s like I am watching a replay of what has been happening in Sofia since June, only it’s in Kyiv and it’s December now. We are witnessing pro-European protests (read values, freedom, transparency, accountability, sovereignty of the citizen) versus retrograde, corrupt governments clinging to power as if this is their last chance to prey on state resources. The techniques of those in power in tackling the protests are identical – organisation of parallel, ‘counter-protests’ supporting the government (the ‘divide and rule’ tactic); police repression and harassment of protesting citizens at their homes; media manipulations and outright, disgraceful smearing campaigns; etc., etc. However, there is one essential difference between the two countries: while in Bulgaria the oligarchs backing the government and controlling huge bits of the economy play on Russia’s team because of coincidence of interests (corrupt, unpredictable Bulgaria, part of a twilight zone on the EU’s periphery where Russia can sell its energy resources and buy assets at discount prices), in Ukraine the oligarchs are increasingly pro-EU: they have come to realise the single market will be good for their business, and they want to continue to be able to visit their expensive properties in London or the French Riviera. Doesn't speak very well of Bulgaria, er?
2) Yanukovych has taken over Ukraine to such an extent that this has started backfiring. He is in charge of the Presidency, obviously, and controls the cabinet of ministers, and his Party of Regions has a majority in the Verkhovna Rada and at local level. Thus a Lukashenko-type personality-centred regime has started budding, and whenever something goes wrong whether in Kyiv or in some distant town, east or west, Yanukovych is automatically to blame. He has come to be the personification, and reason behind, all good and bad in Ukrainian social and political life, and as of late there are not many good things to boast about.
3) Yanukovych will not cede power easily because he is afraid of prosecution. And he is right to be. He knows best what happened to Yulia Tymoshenko, and his sins, in the eyes of the Ukrainian public, are much greater than hers. One other reason for him to cling as long as possible to government is related to the EU. Closer ties with the bloc and even partial adoption by Ukraine of its values and norms would imply hard times for people like Yanukovych, who grew immensely rich since he came to power. His son became one of the wealthiest people in Ukraine. All this will have to be accounted for in a more transparent and EU-associated Ukraine, and he and his family may easily get a ban to travel to the EU. That's why he has bet on procrastinating and playing both the EU and Russia for the sake of the status quo's preservation.
4) For the future of Yanukovych and Ukraine, a decisive role is to be played by the oligarchs. Gladkykh said in Sofia that Ukraine’s political and economic elite are afraid of association with the EU because they simply don’t know how to deal with the Europeans – business-wise and culturally. They know how to do business with the Russians – they feel at home with them, but they are at a loss when having to abide by rules and meet standards as the EU and its investors expect. But this, while it may be true, is not the entire truth. Russian oligarchs are more powerful than their Ukrainian counterparts, and a Ukraine joining Russia’s Customs Union will result in Ukrainian tycoons being pushed out of business or having to pay a very high price to stay. Competition with the Russian oligarchs is not a very healthy business, either. Indeed, as a number of international media publications contend, Ukraine’s oligarchs are steadily shifting sides: they are withdrawing their support for Yanukovych for the sake of a European Ukraine with an access to the biggest single market in the world.
5) The EU and its foreign policy have been awoken to new life because of the Ukrainian fiasco (the failure to sign the AA and the consequent Euromaidan protests). Major EU figures, both from the Brussels institutions and from key member states, have shown their support for Euromaidan by mingling with the protesters and by officially warning Ukrainian authorities to stop police repression. Such a thing is unprecedented. Never did Cathy Ashton go to Gezi Park, for example, to support the legitimate demands of Istanbul protesters, despite Turkey being an official EU candidate country; and never did she join Sofia’s #DANSwithMe popular anti-government action against corruption and lack of transparency, going on in the Bulgarian capital for more than 180 days. And Bulgaria is an EU member. One conclusion from the above is that you have to be both intrinsically European (which Turkey isn't) and big / important enough (which Bulgaria isn't) to be worthy of being the object of the fledgling common EU (foreign) policy. Ukraine is both.
6) The similarities between Bulgaria and Ukraine vis-à-vis the protest movements of 2013 and the governments’ reaction to them are striking. It’s like I am watching a replay of what has been happening in Sofia since June, only it’s in Kyiv and it’s December now. We are witnessing pro-European protests (read values, freedom, transparency, accountability, sovereignty of the citizen) versus retrograde, corrupt governments clinging to power as if this is their last chance to prey on state resources. The techniques of those in power in tackling the protests are identical – organisation of parallel, ‘counter-protests’ supporting the government (the ‘divide and rule’ tactic); police repression and harassment of protesting citizens at their homes; media manipulations and outright, disgraceful smearing campaigns; etc., etc. However, there is one essential difference between the two countries: while in Bulgaria the oligarchs backing the government and controlling huge bits of the economy play on Russia’s team because of coincidence of interests (corrupt, unpredictable Bulgaria, part of a twilight zone on the EU’s periphery where Russia can sell its energy resources and buy assets at discount prices), in Ukraine the oligarchs are increasingly pro-EU: they have come to realise the single market will be good for their business, and they want to continue to be able to visit their expensive properties in London or the French Riviera. Doesn't speak very well of Bulgaria, er?
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